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Abstract—Given the reach of web platforms, bad actors have
considerable incentives to manipulate and defraud users at the
expense of platform integrity. This has spurred research in
numerous suspicious behavior detection tasks, including detection
of sybil accounts, false information, and payment scams/fraud.
In this paper, we draw the insight that many such initiatives can
be tackled in a common framework by posing a detection task
which seeks to find groups of entities which share too many
properties with one another across multiple attributes (sybil
accounts created at the same time and location, propaganda
spreaders broadcasting articles with the same rhetoric and with
similar reshares, etc.) Our work makes four core contributions:
Firstly, we posit a novel formulation of this task as a multi-view
graph mining problem, in which distinct views reflect distinct
attribute similarities across entities, and contextual similarity
and attribute importance are respected. Secondly, we propose
a novel suspiciousness metric for scoring entity groups given the
abnormality of their synchronicity across multiple views, which
obeys intuitive desiderata that existing metrics do not. Finally,
we propose the SLICENDICE algorithm which enables efficient
extraction of highly suspicious entity groups, and demonstrate
its practicality in production, in terms of strong detection perfor-
mance and discoveries on Snapchat’s large advertiser ecosystem
(89% precision and numerous discoveries of real fraud rings),
marked outperformance of baselines (over 97% precision/recall
in simulated settings) and linear scalability.
Index Terms—anomaly detection, attributed data, multi-view
graphs, outlier
I. INTRODUCTION
Online services and social networks (Snapchat, Quora,
Amazon, etc.) have become common means of engagement in
human activities including socialization, information sharing
and commerce. However, given their dissemination power and
reach, they have been long-exploited by bad actors looking
to manipulate user perception, spread misinformation, and
falsely promote bad content. Such malicious activities are
motivated by numerous factors including monetary incentives
[1] to personal [2] and political interests [3]. Tackling online
misbehavior is a challenging research problem, given its vari-
ance with respect to manifestation across platforms, incentive
structures and time. Furthermore, online misbehavior is often
adversarial in nature, and not solvable by systems which aim
to cooperate with users to achieve positive outcomes [4].
Despite these challenges, researchers have made progress in
a variety of scenarios including fake account creation [5],
[6], bot follower detection [7], [8], malware detection [9] and
more. However, many of these solutions require large, labeled
datasets, and offer little to no extensibility. Unfortunately,
given the ever-increasing multitude of new abuse vectors,
application-specific anti-abuse solutions and rich labeled sets
are not always feasible or timely, motivating research towards
flexible, unsupervised methods.
In this work, we propose an unsupervised solution for a
wide-class of misbehavior problems in which we are tasked
with discovering group-level suspicious behavior across at-
tributed data. Our work is inspired by prior works, which
have demonstrated that such behaviors often occur in lockstep
and are better discernible on a group, rather than individual
level [10], [11]. However, we tackle a problem which is left
unaddressed by prior work:
Problem 1 (Informal). How can we quantify and automat-
ically uncover highly-suspicious entity groups with multiple
associated attribute types and values?
This setting naturally extends to a number of abuse detection
scenarios, such as discovering online e-commerce scammers
given profile creation, posting and e-mail address attributes,
or pinpointing fraudulent advertisers given ad URLs, targeting
criteria and key phrases. Our work leverages the insight that
groups of entities who share too many, and too unlikely,
attribute values are unusual and worth investigation. We build
on this intuition by (a) casting the problem of mining suspi-
cious entity groups over multiple attributes as mining cohesive
subgraphs across multiple views, (b) proposing a novel metric
to quantify group suspiciousness in multi-view settings, (c)
developing a scalable algorithm to mine such groups quickly,
and (d) demonstrating effectiveness. Specifically, our contri-
butions are as follows.
Formulation. We propose modeling multi-attribute entity
data as a multi-view graph, which captures notions of similar-
ity via shared attribute values between entities. In our model,
each node represents an entity (e.g. account, organization),
each view represents an attribute (e.g. files uploaded, IP
addresses used, etc.) and each non-zero edge indicates some
attribute value overlap (see Figure 1a)
Suspiciousness Metric. We design a novel suspiciousness
metric, which quantifies subgraph (entity group) suspicious-
ness in multi-view graphs (multi-attribute settings). We iden-
tify desiderata that suspiciousness metrics in this setting should
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(a) Our formulation: multi-attributed entity data as a multi-view graph (b) SLICENDICE detected e-commerce fraud
Fig. 1: Our work tackles suspicious behavior detection in multi-attribute entity data using a multi-view graph mining formulation,
shown in (a). Our SLICENDICE algorithm offers scalable ranking and discovery of such behaviors across multiple entities and
graph views, enabling us to uncover integrity violations like e-commerce fraud on the Snapchat ads platform, shown in (b).
obey, and prove that our metric adheres to these properties
while previously proposed options do not.
Algorithm. We propose SLICENDICE, an algorithm which
scalably extracts highly suspicious subgraphs in multi-view
graphs. Our algorithm uses a greedy, locally optimal search
strategy to expand seeds of similar nodes into larger subgraphs
with more cohesion. We discuss design decisions which im-
prove performance including careful seeding, context-aware
similarity weighting and performance optimizations. Our prac-
tical implementation leverages all these, enabling efficient
entity group mining.
Practicality. We evaluate SLICENDICE both on real-world
data and simulated settings, demonstrating high detection
performance and efficiency. We show effectiveness in detecting
suspicious behaviors on the Snapchat advertiser platform, with
12 distinct attributes and over 230K entities (advertiser orga-
nizations). Figure 1b shows a large network of e-commerce
fraudsters uncovered by our approach (nodes are advertiser or-
ganizations, and edge colors indicate shared attributes, ranked
in suspiciousness). We also conduct synthetic experiments
to evaluate empirical performance against baselines, demon-
strating significant improvements in multi-attribute suspicious
entity group detection. Overall, our methods and results offer
significant promise in bettering web platform integrity.
II. RELATED WORK
We discuss prior work in two related contexts below.
Mining entity groups. Prior works have shown that sus-
picious behaviors often manifest in synchronous group-level
behaviors [11], [10]. Several works assume inputs in the
form of a single graph snapshot. [12], [13] mine communities
using eigenplots from singular value decomposition (SVD)
over adjacency matrices. [14], [15], [16] propose greedy
pruning/expansion algorithms for identifying dense subgraphs.
[17], [18] co-cluster nodes based on information theoretic
measures relating to minimum-description length. Some prior
works [19], [20] tackle subgroup mining from a single graph
which also has node attributes, via efficient subgroup enumer-
ation using tree-based branch-and-bound approaches which
rely on specialized community goodness scoring functions.
Unlike these works, our work entails mining suspicious groups
based on overlap across multiple attributes and graph views,
such that attribute importance is respected and an appropriate
suspiciousness measure is used.
Several works consider group detection in a multi-view (also
known as multi-layer and sometimes multi-plex) formulation.
[21] gives a detailed overview of community mining algo-
rithms in this setting. Our work is unlike these in that it
is the only one which operates in settings with > 2 views,
considers different view importances, and allows for flexible
view selection in subgroup discovery. Moreover, our work
focuses on detection of suspicious groups in a multi-view
setting, rather than communities. [22] uses PARAFAC tensor
decomposition to find network attacks. [23], [24], [25] use
greedy expansion methods for finding entity groups. [26], [27]
use single graph clustering algorithms, followed by stitching
afterwards. Our work differs in that we (a) cast multi-attribute
group detection into a multi-view graph formulation, (b) simul-
taneously mine a flexible set of nodes and views to maximize
a novel suspiciousness metric, and (c) use a compressed
data representation, unlike other methods which incur massive
space complexity from dense matrix/tensor representation.
Quantifying suspiciousness. Most approaches quantify be-
havioral suspiciousness as likelihood under a given model.
Given labeled data, supervised learners have shown use in
suspiciousness ranking tasks for video views [28], account
names [29], registrations [6] and URL spamicity [30]. How-
ever, given considerations of label sparsity, many works posit
unsupervised and semi-supervised graph-based techniques.
[31], [32] propose information theoretic and Bayesian scoring
functions for node suspiciousness in edge-attributed networks.
[7], [33] use reconstruction error from low-rank models to
quantify suspicious connectivity. [34] ranks node suspicious-
ness based on participation in highly-dense communities, [35],
Symbol Definition
K Number of total attributes (graph views)
Ai Set of possible values for attribute i
Ai(·) Maps nodes to attr. i valueset: Ai : G → 2Ai
G Multi-view graph over all views
~K Indicator for multi-view graph views, ~K ∈ {0, 1}K
Gi Single (ith) view of multi-view graph G
G ~K G over chosen
∑ ~K views, G ~K = {Gi|1(Ki)}
N Number of nodes in G
V Volume of graph Gi: N(N − 1)/2
Ci Mass of graph Gi :
∑
(a,b)∈G2 w
(a,b)
i
Pi Density of graph Gi: Ci/V
w
(a,b)
i Edge weight between nodes a, b in Gi, s.t. w(a,b)i ∈ R+
X Multi-view subgraph over all views
~k Indicator for multi-view subgraph views, ~k ∈ {0, 1}K
Xi ith view of multi-view subgraph X
X~k X over chosen
∑~k views, X~k = {Xi|1(ki)}
n Number of nodes in X
v Volume of subgraph of Xi: n(n− 1)/2
ci Mass of subgraph Xi :
∑
(a,b)∈X2 w
(a,b)
i
ρi Density of subgraph Xi: ci/v
z Constraint on chosen subgraph views, |~k| = z
f(·) Mass-parameterized suspiciousness metric
fˆ(·) Density-parameterized suspiciousness metric
TABLE I: Frequently used symbols and definitions.
[36] exploit propagation-based based methods with few known
labels to measure account sybil likelihood, review authenticity
and article misinformation propensity. Our work (a) focuses
on groups rather than entities, and (b) needs no labels.
Several methods exist for group subgraph/tensor scoring;
[37] overviews. The most common are density [37], average
degree [14], [15], subgraph weight, singular value [12]. [23]
defines suspiciousness using log-likelihood of subtensor mass
assuming a Poisson model. Our work differs in that we (a)
quantify suspiciousness in multi-view graphs, and (b) show
that alternative metrics are unsuitable in this setting.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The problem setting we consider (Problem 1) is commonly
encountered in many real anti-abuse scenarios: a practitioner is
given data spanning a large number of entities (i.e. users, orga-
nizations, objects) with a number of associated attribute types
such as webpage URL, observed IP address, creation date,
and associated (possibly multiple) values such as xxx.com,
5.10.15.20, 5.10.15.25, 01/01/19 and is tasked with finding
suspicious behaviors such as fake sybil accounts or engage-
ment boosters.
In tackling this problem, one must make several consid-
erations: What qualifies as suspicious? How can we quantify
suspiciousness? How can we discover such behavior automat-
ically? We build from the intuition that suspicious behaviors
often occur in lockstep across multiple entities (see Section
II), and are most discernible when considering relationships
between entities. For example, it may be challenging without
context to determine suspiciousness of an advertiser link-
ing to URL xxx.com, logging in from IPs 5.10.15.20 and
with creation date 01/01/19; however, knowing that 99 other
advertisers share these exact properties, our perception of
suspiciousness increases drastically. Thus, we focus on mining
suspicious entity groups, where suspiciousness is governed
by the degree of synchronicity between entities, and across
various attributes.
We draw inspiration from graph mining literature; graphs
offers significant promise in characterizing and analyzing
between-entity similarities, and are natural data structures
for the same. Graphs model individual entities as nodes and
relationships between them as edges; for example, a graph
could be used to describe who-purchased-what relationships
between users and products on Amazon. Below, we discuss
our approach for tackling Problem 1, by leveraging the con-
cept of multi-view graphs. We motivate and discuss three
associated building blocks: (a) using multi-view graphs to
model our multi-attributed entity setting, (b) quantifying group
suspiciousness, and (c) mining highly suspicious groups in
such multi-view graphs. Throughout this paper, we utilize
formal notation for reader clarity and convenience wherever
possible; Table I summarizes the frequently used symbols and
definitions, partitioned into attribute-related, graph-related and
subgraph-related notation.
A. Representing Multi-attribute Data
In this work, we represent multi-attribute entity data as a
multi-view graph (MVG). An MVG is a type of graph in which
we have multiple views of interactions, usually in the form
of distinct edge types; to extend our previous example, we
could consider who-purchased-what, who-rates-what and who-
viewed-what relationships as different views between users
and products. Each view of an MVG can individually be
considered as a single facet or mode of behavior, and spans
over the same, fixed set of nodes. In our particular setting,
we consider a representation of multi-attribute data in which
we have a fixed set of nodes (entities), and their relationships
across multiple views (attributes). Thus, edges in each graph
view represent relationships between entities, and are weighted
based on their attribute similarities in that attribute space.
Formally, we have a set of N entities with K associated
attribute types over the attribute value spaces A1 . . .AK . For
notational convenience, we introduce attribute-value accessor
mapping functions A1 . . .AK for the K attribute spaces
respectively, such that Ai : G → 2Ai . Effectively, Ai(a)
denotes the subset of attribute values from A associated with
node a ∈ G. We can construe this as an MVG G on N
nodes (entities) and K views (attributes), such that G is a
set of individual graph views {G1 . . .GK}. For convenience,
we introduce notations Gi and G ~K , to refer to a specific
graph view, and a specific subset of graph views ( ~K is a
K-length vector indicator) respectively. We consider an edge
a ↔ b with w(a,b)i > 0 in view Gi to exist between nodes
a, b if Ai(a) ∩ Ai(b) 6= ∅, or informally a and b share
at least one common feature value on the ith attribute. If
Ai(a) ∩ Ai(b) = ∅ (no overlap between feature values), we
consider that no edge between a, b exists in Gi, or equivalently
that w(a,b)i = 0. In general, we consider non-negative weights,
so that w(a,b)i ∈ R+. We can consider many weighting
Fig. 2: Illustration of Axioms 1-5 through toy examples.
strategies, but posit the notion that large weight between Ai(a)
and Ai(b) indicates intuitively higher, or more rare similarities.
B. Quantifying Group Suspiciousness
Given the above representation, our next aim is to define a
means of quantifying the suspiciousness of an arbitrary multi-
view subgraph (MVSG). This problem is important in practice,
given its implications on manual review prioritization, and
practitioner decision-making on enforcement and actioning
against various discovered behaviors. Our basic intuition is
that a subset of nodes (groups of entities) which are highly
similar to each other (have considerable edge weights between
them in multiple views) are suspicious. But how can we
compare across different MVSGs with varying edge weights,
sizes and views in a principled way? For example, which is
more suspicious: 5 organizations with the same IP address
and URL, or 10 organizations with the same postal code
and creation date? The answer is not obvious; this motivates
us to formally define criteria that any MVSG scoring metric
should obey, and define principled ways of quantifying how
suspiciousness increases or decreases in these contexts.
To do so, we first propose several preliminaries which aid
us in formalizing these criteria. Informally, we consider an
MVSG X of n ≤ N nodes and k ≤ K views as a subset
of nodes, views or both from G; we denote this relationship
compactly as X ⊆ G, and sometimes abuse notation (when
clear) to refer to the associated node set as X . We introduce
similar indexing notation as in the MVG case, such that Xi
and X~k refer to a specific subgraph view, and a subset of
subgraph views (~k is a K-length vector indicator) respectively.
We define the mass of Xi as ci =
∑
(a,b)∈X 2 w
(a,b)
i , which
represents the total sum of edge weights for all edges between
nodes in X . We define the volume of Xi as v = n choose 2
= n(n − 1)/2, which denotes the possible number of edges
between n nodes. Note that the volume of Xi is invariant to
the view chosen and is only dependent on n (thus, we drop
the subscript). Finally, we define the density of Xi as the ratio
between its mass and volume, or ρi = ci/vi. We define analogs
for mass, volume and density of the associated MVG Gi with
Ci, V and Pi respectively. In general, upper-case variables
denote properties of G, while lower-case letters denote prop-
erties of X . Given these terms, which are summarized in Table
1, we propose the following axioms below which should be
satisfied by an MVSG scoring metric. Note that f(·) and fˆ(·)
represent the desired MVSG scoring metric paramerized by
subgraph mass and density, respectively.
Axiom 1 (Mass). Given two subgraphs X ,X ′ ⊆ G with the
same volume, and same mass in all except one view s.t. ci > c′i,
X is more suspicious. Formally,
ci > c
′
i ⇒ f(n,~c,N, ~C) > f(n,~c′, N, ~C)
Intuitively, more mass in a view indicates increased attribute
similarities between entities, which is more suspicious. For
example, it is more suspicious for a group of users to all
share the same profile picture, than to all have different profile
pictures.
Axiom 2 (Size). Given two subgraphs X ,X ′ ⊆ G with same
densities ~ρ, but different volume s.t. v > v′, X is more
suspicious. Formally,
v > v′ ⇒ fˆ(n, ~ρ,N, ~P ) > fˆ(n′, ~ρ,N, ~P )
Intuitively, larger groups which share attributes are more
suspicious than smaller ones, controlling for density of mass.
For example, 100 users sharing the same IP address is more
suspicious than 10 users doing the same.
Axiom 3 (Contrast). Given two subgraphs X ⊆ G, X ′ ⊆
G′ with same masses ~c and size v, s.t. G and G′ have the
same density in all except one view s.t. Pi < P ′i , X is more
suspicious. Formally,
Pi < P
′
i ⇒ fˆ(n, ~ρ,N, ~P ) > fˆ(n, ~ρ,N, ~P ′)
Intuitively, a group with fixed attribute synchrony is more
suspicious when background similarities between attributes are
rare. For example, 100 users using the same IP address is
generally more rare (lower Pi) than 100 users all from the
same country (higher P ′i ).
Axiom 4 (Concentration). Given two subgraphs X ,X ′ ⊆ G
with same masses ~c but different volume s.t. v < v′, X is more
suspicious. Formally,
v < v′ ⇒ f(n,~c,N, ~C) > f(n′,~c,N, ~C)
Intuitively, a smaller group of entities sharing the same
number of similarities is more suspicious than a larger group
doing the same. For example, finding 10 instances (edges) of
IP sharing between a group of 10 users is more suspicious
than finding the same in a group of 100 users.
Axiom 5 (Cross-view Distribution). Given two subgraphs
X ,X ′ ⊆ G with same volume v and same mass in all
except two views i, j with densities Pi < Pj s.t. X has
ci = M, cj = m and X ′ has ci = m, cj = M and M > m,
X is more suspicious. Formally,
Pi < Pj ∧ ci > c′i ∧ cj < c′j ∧ ci + cj = c′i + c′j ⇒
f(n,~c,N, ~C) > f(n,~c′, N, ~C)
Intuitively, a fixed mass is more suspicious when distributed
towards a view with higher edge rarity. For example, given 100
users, it is more suspicious for 100 pairs to share IP addresses
(low Pi) and 10 pairs to share the same country (high Pj),
than vice versa. This axiom builds from Axiom 3.
Figure 2 illustrates these axioms via toy examples. Infor-
mally, these axioms assert that when other subgraph attributes
are held constant, suspiciousness constitutes: higher mass
(Axiom 1), larger volume with fixed density (Axiom 2), higher
sparsity in overall graph (Axiom 3), higher density (Axiom 4),
and more mass distributed in sparser views (Axiom 5). These
axioms serve to formalize desiderata, drawing from intuitions
stemming from prior works; however, prior works [13], [15]
do not consider multi-view cases, and as we show later are
unable to satisfy these axioms. Notably, such metrics produce
unexpected results when scoring MVSGs, and thus lead to
misaligned expectations in resulting rankings. We propose the
following problem:
Problem 2 (MVSG Suspiciousness Scoring). Given an MVG
G, define an MVSG scoring metric f : S → R over the set S
of candidate MVSGs which satisfies Axioms 1-5.
We discuss details of our solution in Section IV.
C. Mining Suspicious Groups
Given an MVSG scoring metric f , our next goal is to
automatically extract MVSGs which score highly with respect
to f . This is a challenging problem, as computing f for each
possible MVSG in G is intractable; there are 2N − 1 non-
empty candidate node subsets, and 2K − 1 non-empty view
subsets over which to consider them. Clearly, we must resort to
intelligent heuristics to mine highly suspicious MVSGs while
avoiding an enumeration strategy. We make several consider-
ations in approaching this task. Firstly, since suspiciousness
is clearly related to shared attribute behaviors, we propose
exploiting our data representation to identify candidate “seeds”
of nodes/entities which are promising to evaluate in terms of
f .
Moreover, we focus on mining MVSGs X (WLOG) given
a constraint on the numbers of views such that |~k|1 = z.
This is for a few reasons: Firstly, it is not straightforward
to compare the suspiciousness of two MVSGs with varying
numbers of views, as these are defined on probability spaces
with different numbers of variables. Secondly, we consider
that (a) entities may not exhibit suspicious behaviors in all K
views/attributes simultaneously, but rather only a subset, and
(b) in evaluation, practitioners can only interpretably parse a
small number of relationship types between a group at once;
thus, in practice we choose a constraint z ≤ K is generally
small and can be suitably chosen and adapted according to
empirical interpretability. In effect, this simplifies our problem
as we only consider evaluating and mining MVSGs defined
over z views, so that we consider (K choose z) total view
subsets, rather than 2K−1. We propose the following problem:
Problem 3 (Mining Suspicious MVSGs). Given an MVG G
on K views, a suspiciousness metric f : S → R over the
set S of candidate MVSGs, and an interpretability constraint
z ≤ K, find the highest scoring MVSGs X ⊆ G (WLOG) for
which |~k|1 = z.
We detail our approach and implementation strategy for
solving this problem in Section V.
IV. PROPOSED SUSPICIOUSNESS METRIC
We propose an MVSG scoring metric based on an under-
lying data model for G in which undirected edges between
the N nodes are distributed i.i.d within each of the K views.
For single graph views, this model is widely known as the
Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (ER) model [38]. The ER model is a standard
“null” model in graph theory, as it provides a framework to
reason about a graph with pure at-chance node interactions,
and is a reasonable assumption given no prior knowledge about
how a govem graph is structured. In our scenario, we consider
two extensions to such a model unexplored by prior work:
(a) we consider multiple graph views, and (b) we consider
weighted cell values instead of binary ones. The first facet
is necessary to support multi-attribute or multi-view settings,
in which behaviors in one view may be very different than
another (i.e. shared IP addresses may be much rarer than
shared postal codes). The second facet is necessary to support
continuous edge weights w(a,b)i ∈ R+ capable of richly
describing arbitrarily complex notions of similarity between
multiple entities (i.e. incorporating both number of shared
properties, as well as their rarities). To handle these extensions,
we propose the Multi-View Erdo¨s-Re´nyi-Exponential model
(MVERE):
Definition 1 (MVERE Model). A multi-view graph G generated
by the MVERE model is defined such that w(a,b)i ∼ Exp(λi)
for all edges a↔ b in Gi.
The MVERE model is a natural fit in our setting for several
reasons. Firstly, the Exponential distribution is continuous and
defined on support R+, which is intuitive as similarity is
generally non-negative. Secondly, it has mode 0, which is
intuitive given that sharing behaviors are sparse (most entities
should not share properties), and the likelihood of observing
high-similarity drops rapidly.
Given that there are V = N(N − 1)/2 edges (including
0-weight edges) in each view, we can derive the closed-form
MLE simply as λi = N(N − 1)/(2Ci) = V/Ci = P−1i . From
this, we can write the distribution of single-view MVSG mass
as follows:
Lemma 1 (MVSG subgraph mass). The mass Mi of a
MVERE-distributed subgraph of Exp(λi) follows Mi ∼
Gamma(v, P−1i )
Proof. This follows from convolution of the Exponen-
tial distribution; given Mi ∼ Exp(λ),
∑g
i=1Mi ∼
Gamma(g, λ).
This enables us to define the suspiciousness of a given
MVSG X across multiple views in terms of the likelihood of
observing some quantity of mass in those views. Our metric
is defined as
Definition 2 (MVSG Scoring Metric f ). The suspiciousness,
f , of an MVSG X with Mi ∼ Gamma(v, P−1i ) and volume v
is the negative log-likelihood of its mass ~c under the MVERE
model:
f
(
n,~c,N, ~C
)
= − log
(
K∏
i=1
Pr (Mi = ci)
)
We can write this metric in longer form as follows:
f
(
n,~c,N, ~C
)
= − log
(
K∏
i=1
Pr (Mi = ci)
)
=
K∑
i=1
−v log
(
V
Ci
)
+ log Γ(v)− (v − 1) log ci − V ci
Ci
=
K∑
i=1
v log
Ci
V
+ v log v − v − log v − v log ci + log ci + V ci
Ci
The last line is due to log Γ(v) = log v!− log v, after which
we use Stirling’s approximation to simplify log v! ≈ v log v−
v. It is sometimes convenient to write suspiciousness in terms
of densities ~ρ, ~P ; thus, we also introduce a so-parameterized
variant fˆ where we use ρi = ci/v and Pi = Ci/v and simplify
as
fˆ
(
n, ~ρ,N, ~P
)
=
K∑
i=1
v log (Pi)− v log ρi − v + log ρi + v ρi
Pi
The intuition for this metric is that high suspiciousness
is indicated by low probability of observing certain mass.
Since we are interested MVSGs with unlikely high density
(indicating synchrony between entities), we consider only
cases where ρi > Pi for all views, to avoid focusing on
excessively sparse MVSGs.
Lemma 2 (Adherence to Axioms). Our proposed suspicious-
ness metric f (and fˆ ) satisfies each of the MVSG scoring
Axioms 1-5.
Proof. We give the full proofs in Section VIII.
We note that while the model and metric above considers
independent views, we could easily consider adapting the
assumed model to account for arbitrary factorizations of the
joint distribution, given this knowledge. However, choosing
a more complex factorization is a problem-specific inference
task, and also raises issues with the curse of dimensionality
which is broader than the scope of our work. We employ the
independence assumption due to its limited estimation chal-
lenges under sparsity, generality, and demonstrated usefulness
in a wealth of prior works despite their simplicity.
A. Issues with Alternative Metrics
One may ask, why not use previously established metrics of
suspiciousness? We next show that these metrics produce re-
sults which violate one or more proposed Axioms, and are thus
1CSSusp is limited to discrete edge counts and cannot handle continuous
mass settings.
TABLE II: Comparison with alternative metrics.
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Mass 4 4 4 4 ? 1 4
Size 4 4 8 4 ? 1 4
Contrast 8 8 8 8 ? 1 4
Concentration 8 4 4 4 ? 1 4
Cross-View Distr. 8 8 8 8 8 4
unsuitable for our problem. We compare their performance on
the toy settings from Figure 2. Each subgraph pair illustrates
one of Axioms 1-5, and the shaded figures indicates higher in-
tuitive suspiciousness. We consider 5 alternative metrics: mass
(Mass) and density (Dens) [37], average degree (AvgDeg)
[14], singular value (SingVal) [12] and CSSusp (metric
from [23]).
Overview of Alternative Metrics. Prior work has suggested
Mass, AvgDeg and Dens as suspiciousness metrics for single
graph views [25], [24], [15]. We extend these to multi-view
cases by construing an aggregated view with edge weights
summed across the K views. [23] proposes CSSusp for
suspiciousness in discrete, multi-modal tensor data; we can
apply this by construing an MVSG X as a 3-mode tensor of
n× n×K. In short, other metrics are agnostic to differences
across views, hence they all violate Axiom 5 (Cross-View Dis-
tribution). Below, we discuss the specifics of each alternative
metric, and their limitations with respect to Axioms 1-4.
Mass: Mass is defined as
∑K
i=1 ci, or the sum over all edge
weights and views. Table II shows that it violates Axioms 2
(Size) and 3 (Contrast) by not considering subgraph size v or
graph density Pi.
AvgDeg: Average degree is defined as
∑K
i=1 ci/n, or
average Mass per node. It does not consider graph density
Pi and thus violates Axiom 3 (Contrast).
Dens: Density is defined as
∑K
i=1 ci/v, or average Mass
per edge, over v edges. It trivially violates Axiom 2 (Size) by
not considering the ratio of subgraph density and size. It also
violates Axiom 3 (Contrast) by not considering graph density
Pi.
SingVal: Singular values are factor “weights” associ-
ated with the singular value decomposition A = UΣVT ;
here, we consider the leading singular value Σ0,0 over the
view-aggregated A. [7] shows that for i.i.d. cells in A,
Σ0,0 =
√
nρi, though this does not hold generally. Under
this assumption, the metric violates Axiom 3 (Contrast), by
not considering graph density Pi.
CSSusp: [23] defines block suspiciousness as
− log(Pr(M = ∑Ki=1 ci)), where M is subtensor mass
under assumption that cells are discrete, Poisson draws.
However, this constrains adherence to Axioms 1-4 (Mass,
Size, Contrast and Concentration) only for discrete settings,
and is unusable for continuous edge weights/cell values. This
limitation is notable, as later shown in Sections V-A and VI.
V. PROPOSED ALGORITHM: SLICENDICE
Given the metric defined in the previous section, we next
aim to efficiently mine highly suspicious groups, as proposed
in Problem 3. At a high-level, our approach is to start with
a small MVSG over a few nodes and views, and expand via
a greedy, alternating maximization approach (between nodes
and views), evaluating f until a local optimum is reached. Our
main considerations are twofold: How can we scalably expand
a given seed until convergence? and How can we select good
seeds in the first place? We next address these questions.
Our goal is to find MVSGs X ⊆ G (WLOG) which score
highest on f , and also meet the interpretability constraint
|~k|1 = z. As mentioned in Section III-C, full enumeration
is combinatorial and computationally intractable in large data.
Thus, we resort to a greedy approach which allows scalable
convergence to locally optimal MVSGs. Our approach, SLI-
CENDICE, is outlined in Algorithm 1.
In short, the algorithm begins by seeding an MVSG defined
over a few nodes and z views according to some notion
of suitability, and then utilizes an alternating maximization
approach to improve the seed: the node set is kept fixed while
the view set is updated, and subsequently the view set is kept
fixed while the node set is updated. The updation steps only
occur when f increases, and since suspiciousness is bounded
for any given X (i.e. there are a finite number of possible
choices for nodes and views), we ensure convergence to a
local optimum. Next, we discuss updating and seeding choices,
where we cover the referenced updation and seeding methods.
Updating choices. In order to find a highly suspi-
cious group of entities, we aim to optimize the view
set and node set selection via the UPDATEVIEWS and
UPDATENODES methods. UPDATEVIEWS can be written con-
cisely as argmax~k f
(
n,~c,N, ~C
)
, subject to |~k| = z. This is
straightforward given our metric; we independently choose the
top-z most suspicious views, given the fixed node set from the
prior iteration. For UPDATENODES, we limit our search space
to adding or removing a single node in the MVSG, which
is dramatically more tractable than the 2N − 1 possible node
set choices over G. We write UPDATENODES concisely as
argmaxX ′ f
(
n,~c,N, ~C
)
, subject to |X ′ \X |+ |X \X ′| ≤ 1,
meaning that each update changes the node set by, at most, a
single entity (one more or one less).
Seeding choices. Clearly, update quality relies on reason-
able seeding strategy which is able to find candidate suspicious
MVSGs and also explore G. The SEEDVIEWS method can be
achieved in multiple ways; ultimately, the goal is to chooses
z initial views such that the seeds expand to a diverse set
suspicious MVSGs. Given the desire for diversity, a reasonable
approach is to sample z views uniformly as done in prior work
[39], [25]. However, a downside with random sampling is that
it does not respect our intuition regarding the non-uniform
value of entity similarity across views. For example, consider
that a view of country similarity has only 195 unique values,
whereas a view of IP Address similarity has 232 unique values;
naturally, it is much more common for overlap in the former
Algorithm 1 SLICENDICE
Require: MVG G (N nodes, K views, ~C masses), constraint z ≤ K
1: ~k ← SEEDVIEWS(G, z) . choose z views
2: X~k ← SEEDNODES(G, ~k) . n nodes, ~c masses
3: S ← f
(
n,~c,N, ~C
)
. compute suspiciousness metric
4: do . alternating optimization
5: S′ ← S
6: ~k ← UPDATEVIEWS(G,X ) . revise view set
7: X~k ← UPDATENODES(G,X~k) . revise node set
8: S ← f
(
n,~c,N, ~C
)
9: while S > S′ . repeat until S converges
10: return
(X~k, S)
than the latter, despite the latter having a higher signal-to-
noise ratio. Thus, in practice, we aim to sample views in a
weighted fashion, favoring those in which overlap occurs less
frequently. We considered using the inverse of view densities
~ρ as weights, but we observe that density is highly sensitive
to outliers from skewed value frequencies. We instead use the
inverse of the qth frequency percentiles across views as more
robust estimates of their overlap propensity (q ≥ 95 works
well in practice). The effect is that lower signal-to-noise ratio
views such as country are more rarely sampled.
Defining SEEDNODES is more challenging. As Section
IV mentions, we target overly dense MVSGs X (WLOG)
for which ρi > Pi for all views. The key challenge is
identifying seeds which satisfy this constraint, and thus offer
promise in expanding to more suspicious MVSGs. Again, one
could consider randomly sampling node sets and discarding
unsatisfactory ones, but given that there are z constraints (one
per view), the probability of satisfaction rapidly decreases
as z increases (Section VI elaborates). To this end, we pro-
pose a carefully designed, greedy seeding technique called
GREEDYSEED (see Algorithm 2) which enables us to quickly
discover good candidates. Our approach exploits that that
satisfactory seeds occur when entities share more similarities,
and strategically constructs a node set across views which
share properties with each other. Essentially, we initialize a
candidate seed with two nodes that share a similarity in a
(random) one of the chosen views, and try to incrementally
add other nodes connected to an existing seed node in views
where the constraint is yet unsatisfied. If unable to do so after a
number of attempts, we start fresh. The process is stochastic,
and thus enables high seed diversity and diverse suspicious
MVSG discovery.
A. Implementation
We describe several considerations in practical implemen-
tation, which improve result relevance and computational
efficiency.
Result quality. The quality of resulting MVSGs depends
on the degree to which they accurately reflect truly suspi-
cious synchronous behaviors. Not all synchronicity is equally
suspicious, such as for attributes from free-form user text
input. Consider an attribute “File Name” for user uploads. An
edge between two users which share an uploaded file named
“Cheap-gucci-ad.jpg” is, intuitively, more suspiciouss than if
the file was named “Test” (which is a common placeholder
Algorithm 2 GREEDYSEED
Require: MVG G (N nodes, K views, P dens.), views ~k
1: define SHUFFLE(S): return S in random order
2: define CHOOSE(S, r): return r random elements from S
3: V ← {i | 1(ki)} . chosen view set
4: Hvei (a)← a⇒ A−1i (a) ∀a ∈ A, i ∈ V . value-to-entity hashmap
5: Hevi (a)← a⇒ Ai(a) ∀a ∈ G, i ∈ V . entity-to-value hashmap
6: i← CHOOSE(V, 1) . choose a view
7: a← CHOOSE({a | |Hvei (a) | ≥ 2} , 1) . choose a shared value
8: X ← CHOOSE(Hvei (a), 2) . initialize seed with similar entities
9: for view i ∈ SHUFFLE(V) do
10: t← 0 . keep track of attempts
11: while (ρi < Pi and t ¡ 20) do . try to satisfy constraint
12: e1 ∈ SHUFFLE(X , 1) . choose entity already in X
13: a← CHOOSE(Hevi (e1), 1) . choose a shared value
14: e2 ← CHOOSE(Hvei (a), 1) . choose a similar entity
15: X ← X ∪ e2 . grow seed
16: t← t+ 1
17: end while
18: if (ρi < Pi) then
19: go to 6 . start fresh if constraint not yet met
20: end if
21: end for
22: return X~k
that unrelated users are likely to use). To avoid considering
the latter case, which is a type of spurious synchronicity,
we use techniques from natural language processing to care-
fully weight similarities in the MVG construction. Firstly,
we enable value blacklisting for highly common stop-words
(e.g. Test). Overlap on a stopworded value produces 0 mass
(no penalty). Next, we weight edges for other value overlaps
according to the common TF-IDF NLP technique, which in
this case is best characterized as a value’s inverse entity
frequency (IEF) [40]. We define the IEF for value v in
view i as: ief(vi) =
(
N/ log
(
1 + |A−1i (vi) |
))2
, which
significantly discounts common values. We let w(a,b)i =∑
vi∈A(a)∩A(b) ief(vi), so that edge weight between two
nodes (entities) depends on both number and rarity of shared
values.
Computational efficiency. Next, we discuss several opti-
mizations to improve the speed of suspicious MVSG discov-
ery. Firstly, we observe that SLICENDICE is trivially paral-
lelizable. In our implementation, we are able to run thousands
of seed generation and expansion processes simultaneously by
running in a multi-threaded setting, and aggregating a ranked
list afterwards. Another notable performance optimization
involves the computation of view masses ~c in UPDATENODES,
which is the slowest part of SLICENDICE. A naı¨ve approach
to measure synchronicity given n nodes is to quadratically
evaluate pairwise similarity, which is highly inefficient. We
instead observe that it is possible to compute ci by cheaply
maintaining the number of value frequencies in a view-specific
hashmap Ji, such that Ji(v) = | {e ∈ X | v ∈ Ai(e)} |. Specif-
ically, Ji (v) indicates that Ji (v)
2 − Ji (v) similarities exist
in the subgraph view on the value v, and since each of
them contribute ief(v) weight, we can write the total mass
as ci =
∑
vi∈Ai ief(vi) (Ji (vi))
2 − Ji (vi). This approach
makes it possible to calculate view mass in linear time with
respect to the number of subgraph nodes, which drastically
improves efficiency. Furthermore, the space requirements are,
for each view, a hashmap of value frequencies as well as a
table of unique attribute values for each entity, a compressed
representation compared to tensor-based approaches [12]. The
time and space complexity requirements are more formally
described in Section VI-C.
VI. EVALUATION
Our experiments aim to answer the following questions.
• Q1. Detection performance: How effective is SLI-
CENDICE in detecting suspicious behaviors in real and
simulated settings? How does it perform in comparison
to prior works?
• Q2. Efficiency: How do GREEDYSEED and SLI-
CENDICE scale theoretically and empirically on large
datasets?
A. Datasets
We use both real and simulated settings in evaluation.
Snapchat advertiser platform. We use a dataset of ad-
vertiser organization accounts on Snapchat, a leading social
media platform. Our data consists of N = 230K organizations
created on Snapchat from 2016-2019. Each organization is
associated with several single-value (e.g. contact email) and
multi-value attributes (e.g names of ad campaigns). All in all,
we use K = 12 attributes deigned most relevant to suspicious
behavior detection, made available to us by Snapchat’s Ad
Review team, whom we partner with for domain expert
analysis and investigation:
• Account details (6): Organization name, e-mails, contact
name, zip-code, login IP addresses, browser user agents.
• Advertisement content (6): Ad campaign name (e.g.
Superbowl Website), media asset hashes, campaign head-
lines (e.g. 90% off glasses!), brand name (e.g. GAP),
iOS/Android app identifiers, and external URLs.
Based on information from the domain experts, we pruned
1.7K organizations from the original data, primarily including
advertisement agencies and known affiliate networks which
can have high levels of synchrony (often marketing for the
same subsets of companies), and limited our focus to the
remaining 228K organizations.
Simulated settings. We additionally considered several sim-
ulated attack settings, based on realistic attacker assumptions.
Our intuition is that attack nodes will have higher propensity to
share attribute values than normal ones, and may target varying
attributes and have varying sophistication. Our simulation
parameters include N (entity count) and K (total attribute
types), ~u (length-K, cardinalities of attribute value spaces),
n, k (entities and attributes per attack), c (number of attacks),
λ (value count per normal entity), and τ (attack temperature,
s.t. attackers choose from a restricted attribute space with
cardinalities τ−1~u. Together, these parameters can express a
wide variety of attack types. Our specific attack procedure is:
1) Initialize N normal entities. For each attr. i, draw
Poisson(λ) specific values uniformly over [1, ui].
2) Conduct an attack, by randomly sampling n entities and
k attributes. For each attr. i, draw Poisson(2λ) specific
attr. values uniformly over [1, τ−1ui]. Repeat c times.
Fig. 3: SLICENDICE detects both blatant (left) and more
stealthy (right) fraudsters on Snapchat’s ad platform. Attribute
Views in each Legend are sorted by suspiciousness (Red =
Highest, Purple = Lowest).
Unless otherwise mentioned, for each scenario we fix param-
eters as N = 500 nodes, K = 10 views, ui = 50i attr.
cardinality, n = 50 nodes per attack, k = 3 views per attack,
λ = 5 mean values drawn per node and attribute, and τ = 10
temperature.
B. Detection performance
We discuss performance in both settings.
Snapchat advertiser platform. We deployed SLICENDICE
on Google Cloud compute engine instances with high vCPU
count to enable effective parallelization across many seeds
over 2 days. During this time, we yielded a total of 6, 050
suspected entity group behaviors within Snapchat data. We
fixed z = 3 for this run, based on two reasonS: (a) input from
our Ad Review partners, who noted that too many apparent
features hindered the review process via information overload,
and (b) z = 3 balances the two extremes of low z preventing
discovery of more distributed, stealthier fraud which can only
be uncovered by overlaying multiple graph views, and high
z hurting interpretability and increasing difficulty to satisfy
density constraints. Finally, after mining and ranking many
MVSGs, we aggregate and filter results for expert review by
pruning “redundant” MVSGs which covering the same set of
nodes; we use a Jaccard similarity threshold η = 0.05 to
determine overlap. We note that the number of distinct blocks
was fairly robust to η; for example, a more liberal threshold
of η = .25 yielded 636 distinct groups. We chose η con-
servatively in order to minimize redundancy in results shared
with the Ad Review team. We evaluated our methods both
quantitatively and qualitatively in coordination with them. We
were not able to compare with other suspicious group mining
methods which rely on block decomposition or search [41],
[12], [14], [25], [23] as these are highly dense matrices/tensors
which are too large to manifest for this scale.
Quantitative Evaluation: We sort the suspected sub-graphs
in descending order and submitted those in the top 50 groups
to the Ad Review team for in-depth, manual validation of
the constituent 2736 organizations. We provided the domain
experts with 3 assets to aid evaluation: (a) network visualiza-
tions like those in Figure 3, (b) mappings between the highest
frequency occurring attribute values for each attribute, and all
organization entities associated with those attributes, and (c)
entity-level indices listing all instances of attribute synchrony
and associated values, for each organization involved per
group. While the exact review process and signals used are
masked for security reasons, the review process generally
consisted of evaluating individual advertiser accounts in each
cluster, and determining their suspiciousness based on previous
failed payments, previously submitted spammy or fraudulent-
looking ads, similarity with previously discovered advertiser
abuse vectors, and other proprietary signals. From surveying
these organizations, reviewers found that an overwhelming
2435 were connected to fraudulent behaviors that violated
Snapchat’s advertiser platform Terms of Service, resulting
in an organization-level precision of 89%. The organizations
spanned diverse behaviors, including individuals who created
multiple accounts to making multiple (similar) accounts to
generate impressions before defaulting early on their spending
budget (avoiding payment), those selling counterfeit goods or
running e-commerce scams, fraudulent surveys with falsely
promised rewards, and more. Intuitively, the diversity of these
behaviors supports the flexibility of our problem formulation;
despite SLICENDICE’s agnosticism to the multiple types of
abuse, it was able to uncover them automatically using a
shared paradigm.
Qualitative Evaluation: We inspect two instances of ad-
vertiser fraud, shown in Figure 3, with help from the Ad
Review team. Although SLICENDICE selected groups based
on suspiciousness according to only the top (z = 3) views,
we show the composites of similarities for all 12 attributes
to illustrate the differences between the two attacks. On the
left, we show the first case of blatant fraud across 500
organizations, which are connected across all of the considered
attributes to varying degrees. Many of these organizations were
accessed using a common subset of IP addresses, with the
cluster near the center all sharing browser user agents. Upon
further inspection, we find that these accounts are engaging in
e-commerce fraud, and link to a series of URLs that follow the
pattern contact-usXX.[redacted].com, where XX ranges from
01-27. Multiple accounts link to these common URLs and
share common advertisement headlines, which combined with
shared login activities ranks the group very highly according
to our metric. Our second case study is of a smaller ring of
70 organizations, which could be considered stealthy fraud.
These organizations appear to market a line of Tarot card
and Horoscope applications. We noticed attempts taken by the
fraudsters to cloak this ring from detection: no app identifier
appears more than 4 times across the dataset, but most of
the organizations have identifiers associating to similar app
variants. This discovery illustrates SLICENDICE’s ability to
“string together” shared properties across multiple attribute
views to discover otherwise hard-to-discern behaviors.
Simulated settings. We consider detection performance on
simulations matching several realistic scenarios.
(a) High attack sync. (b) Low attack sync. (c) High-signal attacks (d) Low-signal attacks (e) High-dim attacks
Fig. 4: SLICENDICE (blue, near the top) consistently achieves extremely high precision/recall on various, realistic attack settings,
despite changing attack complexity. Other methods fail due to their inability to respect differences between attributes/views
and overemphasis on global density.
1) High attacker synchrony: Default settings; attacks sam-
ple attributes from 1/10th of associated attribute spaces,
making them much denser than the norm.
2) Low attacker synchrony: τ = 2. Attribute spaces are
restricted to 1/2 and thus much harder to detect.
3) High-signal attribute attacks: Attack views are sampled
with weights ∝ ~u (more likely to land in sparse views).
4) Low-signal attribute attacks: Attack views are sampled
with weights ∝ 1/~u (more likely to land in dense views).
5) Attacks in high dimensionality: K = 30. Attacks are
highly distributed in 3× higher dimensionality.
Our detection task is to classify each attribute overlap as sus-
picious or non-suspicious; thus, we aim to label each nonzero
entry (“behavior”) in the resulting N × N × K tensor. We
evaluate SLICENDICE’s precision/recall performance along
with several state-of-the-art group detection approaches in
this task. For each method, we penalize each behavior in a
discovered block using the block score given by that method,
and sum results over multiple detected blocks. The intuition
is that a good detector will penalize behaviors associated with
attack entities and attributes more highly. We compare against
PARAFAC decomposition [22], MultiAspectForensics (MAF)
[42], Mzoom [25], SVD [12], and AvgDeg [14]. For SVD and
AvgDeg which only operate on single graph views, we use the
aggregated view adjacency matrix, whereas for others we use
the adjacency tensor. SLICENDICE utilizes the compressed
representation discussed in Section V-A. For SVD, we use
singular value (SingVal) as the block score. For PARAFAC
and MAF, we use the block norm which is effectively the
higher order SingVal. AvgDeg uses the average subgraph
degree (AvgDeg), and Mzoom measures mass suspiciousness
under the Poisson assumption (CSSusp). Section VIII gives
further details regarding baseline comparison.
Figure 4 shows precision/recall curves for all 5 attack
scenarios; note that SLICENDICE significantly outperforms
competitors in all cases, often maintaining over 90% precision
while making limited false positives. Alternatives quickly drop
to low precision for substantial recall, due to their inability to
both (a) find and score groups while accounting for differences
across attributes (Axiom 5), and (b) correctly discern the
suspicious from non-suspicious views, even when the right
subgraph is discovered. In practice, this allow attributes with
low signal-to-noise ratio and higher natural density to over-
power suspicious attacks which occur in less dense views.
C. Efficiency
We consider efficiency of both SLICENDICE, as well as
our seeding algorithm, GREEDYSEED. The time complexity
of SEEDVIEWS is trivially O(z), as it involves only choosing
z random views. We can write the complexity of any suitable
method for SEEDNODES loosely as O(zt¯), given z views
and t¯ iterations to satisfy each density constraint ρi > Pi
successively. However, in practice, this notion of t¯ is ill-
defined and can adversely affect performance. We explore
practical performance in average time to find suitable seeds
which satisfy constraints, for both random seeding and our
GREEDYSEED: Figure 5a shows that our GREEDYSEED finds
seeds 100 − 1000× faster than random seeding on real data;
note the log scale. Random seeding struggles significantly in
meeting constraints as the number of views increases, further
widening the performance gap between the methods. Each
iteration of UPDATENODES is O(NKA¯) given N nodes, K
views, and A¯ values per attribute. UPDATEVIEWS is sim-
ply O(z log z), as UPDATENODES already updates subgraph
masses ~c across all views. The runtime in practice is dominated
by UPDATENODES; assuming T¯ iterations per MVSG, the
overall SLICENDICE time complexity is O(NKA¯T¯ ). Figures
5b-5c show that SLICENDICE scales linearly with respect to
both entities (over fixed iterations) and iterations (over fixed
entities). Moreover, the overall space complexity is O(KA¯),
due to the compact attribute-oriented data representation de-
scribed in Section V-A. Note that alternative group mining
methods which rely on block decomposition or search were
infeasible to run on real data, due to the sheer attribute sharing
density in the tensor representation, which grows quadratically
with each shared value.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we tackled the problem of scoring and dis-
covering suspicious behavior in multi-attribute entity data. Our
work makes several notable contributions. Firstly, we construe
this data as a multi-view graph, and formulate this task in terms
of mining suspiciously dense multi-view subgraphs (MVSGs).
We next propose and formalize intuitive desiderata (Axioms
1-5) that MVSG scoring metrics should obey to match human
intuition, and designed a novel suspiciousness metric based
(a) Time to seed (b) Time vs. # entities (c) Time vs.
# iterations
Fig. 5: Our GREEDYSEED finds suitable seeds 100 − 1000×
faster than random seeding (a). Moreover, SLICENDICE scales
linearly in number of entities (b) and iterations (c).
on the proposed MVERE model which satisfies these met-
rics, unlike alternatives. Next, we proposed the SLICENDICE
algorithm, which enables scalable ranking and discovery of
MVSGs suspicious according to our metric, and discussed
practical implementation details which help result relevance
and computational efficiency. Finally, we demonstrated strong
empirical results, including experiments on real data from
the Snapchat advertiser platform where we achieved 89%
precision over 2.7K organizations and uncovered numerous
fraudulent advertiser rings, consistently high precision/recall
(over 97%) and outperformance of several state-of-the-art
group mining algorithms, and linear scalability.
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VIII. REPRODUCIBILITY
A. Satisfaction of Axioms
Below, we show that our suspiciousness metric f (and fˆ )
satisfies Axioms 1-5, and posited in Lemma 2. In each case,
we consider how f or fˆ changes as individual properties vary;
since they are simply reparameterizations of one another, we
suffice it to prove adherence to each axiom using the more
convenient parameterization. We reproduce the axioms with
each proof below for reader convenience.
Axiom (Mass). Given two subgraphs X ,X ′ ⊆ G with the
same volume, and same mass in all except one view s.t. ci > c′i,
X is more suspicious. Formally,
ci > c
′
i ⇒ f(n,~c,N, ~C) > f(n,~c′, N, ~C)
Proof of Axiom 1 (Mass).
∂fi
∂ci
=
V
Ci
− v − 1
ci
Because we are operating under the constraint Pi < pi, then
P−1i > p
−1
i which implies that
V
Ci
> vci >
v−1
ci
. Therefore,
∂fi
∂ci
> 0 and so as mass increases, suspiciousness increases.
Axiom (Size). Given two subgraphs X ,X ′ ⊆ G with same
densities ~p, but different volume s.t. v > v′, X is more
suspicious. Formally,
v > v′ ⇒ fˆ(n, ~p,N, ~P ) > fˆ(n′, ~p,N, ~P )
Proof of Axiom 2 (Size). The derivative of fˆi with respect to
subgraph volume is:
∂fˆi
∂v
= logPi − log ρi − 1 + ρi
Pi
=
ρi
Pi
− log ρi
Pi
− 1
This implies that ∂fˆi∂v > 0, because x − log x > 1 always
holds when x > 1 (which holds given ρi > ρi). Therefore,
suspiciousness increases as volume increases.
Axiom (Contrast). Given two subgraphs X ⊆ G, X ′ ⊆ G′ with
same masses ~c and size v, s.t. G and G′ have the same density
in all except one view s.t. Pi < P ′i , X is more suspicious.
Formally,
Pi < P
′
i ⇒ fˆ(n, ~p,N, ~P ) > fˆ(n, ~p,N, ~P ′)
Proof of Axiom 3 (Contrast). The derivative of fˆi suspicious-
ness with respect to density Pi is:
∂fˆi
∂Pi
= v logPi + v
ρi
Pi
=
v
Pi
− v ρi
Pi
2 =
v
Pi
(
1− ρi
Pi
)
This implies that ∂fˆi∂Pi < 0, because v/Pi > 0 and ρi > Pi.
Thus, as graph density increases, suspiciousness decreases. Al-
ternatively, as sparsity increases, suspiciousness increases.
Axiom (Concentration). Given two subgraphs X ,X ′ ⊆ G with
same masses ~c but different volume s.t. v < v′, X is more
suspicious. Formally,
v < v′ ⇒ f(n,~c,N, ~C) > f(n′,~c,N, ~C)
Proof of Axiom 4 (Concentration). The derivative of view i’s
contribution suspiciousness (parameterized by mass) and w.r.t
the volume is:
∂fi
∂v
= log
Ci
V
+ log v + 1− 1− 1
v
− log ci
= logPi + log ρ
−1
i −
1
v
= log
Pi
ρi
− 1
v
= − log ρi
Pi
− 1
v
− log ρiPi <= −1 because
ρi
Pi
> 1, so therefore ∂fi∂v < 0.
Therefore, for a fixed sub-graph mass ci, suspiciousness de-
creases as volume increases.
Axiom (Cross-view Distribution). Given two subgraphs
X ,X ′ ⊆ G with same volume v and same mass in all
except two views i, j with densities Pi < Pj s.t. X has
ci = M, cj = m and X ′ has ci = m, cj = M and M > m,
X is more suspicious. Formally,
Pi < Pj ∧ ci > c′i ∧ cj < c′j ∧ ci + cj = c′i + c′j ⇒
f(n,~c,N, ~C) > f(n,~c′, N, ~C)
Proof of Axiom 5 (Cross-View Distribution). Assume that
view i is sparser than view j (Pi < Pk), and we are
considering a sub-graph which has identical mass in both
views (ci = cj). Adding mass to the sparser view i will
increase suspiciousness more than adding the same amount
of mass to the denser view j because:
∂fi
∂v
− ∂fj
∂v
=
(
V
Ci
− v − 1
ci
)
−
(
V
Cj
− v − 1
cj
)
= P−1i − P−1j > 0
B. Baseline Implementations for Comparison
We compared against 5 baselines in Section VI: PARAFAC
[22], MAF [42], Mzoom [25], AvgDeg [14] and SVD [12].
Below, we give background and detail our implementations
for these baselines.
1) PARAFAC: PARAFAC [41] is one of the most common
tensor decomposition approaches, and can be seen as the
higher-order analog to matrix singular value decomposition.
An F -rank PARAFAC decomposition aims to approximate a
multimodal tensor as a sum of F rank-one factors which, when
summed, best reconstruct the tensor according to a Frobenius
loss. In our case, the decomposition produces factor matrices
A of N × r, B of N × r and C of K × r, such that we can
write the tensor T associated with MVG G as
T ≈
F∑
f=1
af ◦ bf ◦ cf
where af denotes the f th column vector of A (analogue for
bf and cf ), and [~a ◦~b ◦ ~c](i, j, k) = aibjck. Since PARAFAC
gives continuous scores per node in the ~a and ~b vectors for
each rank-one factor, we sum them and then use the decision
threshold suggested in [25] (2.0/
√
N ) to mark nodes above
that threshold as part of the block. We then select the top
k views which individually have the highest singular value
over the associated submatrix, and penalize the associated
entries with the norm of the f th rank-one tensor (closest
approximation of SingVal in higher dimensions). We use
the Python tensorly library implementation, and F = 5
decomposition.
2) MAF: MAF [42] also utilizes PARAFAC decomposition,
but proposes a different node inclusion method. Their intuition
is to look for the largest “bands” of nodes which have similar
factor scores, as they are likely clusters. Since in our case,
~a and ~b both reflect node scores, we sum them to produce
the resulting node factor scores. We then compute a log-
spaced histogram over these using 20 bins (as proposed by
the authors), and sort the histogram from highest to lowest
frequency bins. We move down this histogram, including
nodes in each bin until reaching the 90% energy criterion
or 50% bin size threshold proposed by the authors. We mark
these nodes as included in the block, and select the top k views
with the highest associated submatrix singular values, as for
PARAFAC. We likewise penalize entries in this block using
the associated block norm. We use the Python tensorly
library implementation, and specify a F = 5 decomposition.
3) Mzoom: Mzoom [25] proposes a greedy method for
dense subtensor mining, which is flexible in handling various
block-level suspiciousness metrics. It has been shown outper-
form [23] in terms of discovering blocks which maximize
CSSusp metric, and hence we use it over the method proposed
in [23]. The algorithm works by starting with the original
tensor T, and greedily shaves values from modes which
maximize the benefit in terms of improving CSSusp. When
a block T′ is found which maximizes CSSusp over the local
search, Mzoom prunes it from the overall tensor in order to
not repeatedly converge to that block, and repeats the next
iteration with T − T′. As Mzoom does not allow selection
of a fixed k views, we only modify their implementation to
add the constraint that for any blocks found with ≥ k views,
we limit output to the first k for fairness. We penalize entries
in each block with that block’s CSSusp score. We use the
authors’ original implementation, which was written in Java
(and available on their website) and specify 500 blocks to be
produced (unless the tensor is fully deflated/empty sooner).
4) SVD: SVD [12], as discussed in Section IV-A, is a
matrix decomposition method which aims to produce a low-
rank optimal reconstruction of A according to Frobenius norm.
In our case, since we aggregate over the K views and produce
a resulting N ×N matrix for G, a rank F SVD decomposes
the matrix A = UΣVT , where U,V are N×F , and Sigma
is F×F and diagonal, containing the singular values. Loosely,
SVD effectively discovers low-rank structures in the form
of clusters, such that U,V indicate cluster affinity and Σ
indicates cluster strength or scale. We take a similar approach
as for PARAFAC, in that for each rank f , we sum the factor
scores uf and vf and use a decision threshold of 2.0/
√
1000 to
mark node membership in the given block. Then, we rank the
individual views according to their respective leading singular
values, and choose the top k for inclusion. We then penalize
entries in the block with the submatrix SingVal score. We
use the Python scipy package, and specifically the svds
method to run sparse SVD, for which we use an F = 5
decomposition.
5) AvgDeg: [14] proposes an algorithm, which we call
AvgDeg, for greedily mining dense subgraphs according to
the AvgDeg notion of suspiciousness. The algorithm proposed
gives a 2-approximation in terms of returning the maximally
dense subgraph, and works by considering a single graph
G, and greedily shaving nodes with minimum degree while
keeping track of the AvgDeg metric at each iteration. Upon
convergence, the algorithm returns a subgraph which scores
highly given AvgDeg. As for SVD, we consider G to be
aggregated over all K views. Though the algorithm proposed
by the author was initially defined in terms of unweighted
graphs, we adapt it to weighted graph setting by shaving
nodes greedily with minimum weighted degree rather than the
adjacent edge count. Upon discovery of one subgraph G′, we
repeat the next iteration with G − G′. After finding the nodes
for each subgraph, we choose the top k views with the highest
individual AvgDeg for inclusion in the block. We request up
to 500 blocks, but in practice find that the algorithm converges
very quickly because it incorrectly prunes a large number of
nodes in earlier iterations.
6) SLICENDICE: We use the standard implementation as
described in Section V-A, evaluating over 500 blocks. Our im-
plementation is written in Python, and will be made available
publicly.
C. Source Code and Datasets
All source code including calculation of the proposed
suspiciousness metric, and our implementation of the SLI-
CENDICE algorithm is available at http://github.com/hamedn/
SliceNDice/. Our implementation was done using Python 3.7.
The algorithm takes as input a CSV, where each row is an
entity and each column is an attribute, and returns a ranked
list of suspicious groups by row identifier. The code used to
generate simulated attacks as discussed in Section VI is also
included, and allows researchers and practitioners to create
their own simulated attack datasets by modifying simulation
parameters: N (entity count), K (total attribute types), ~u
(length-K, cardinalities of attribute value spaces), n, k (entities
and attributes per attack), c (number of attacks), λ (value count
per normal entity), and τ (attack temperature, s.t. attackers
choose from a restricted attribute space with cardinalities
τ−1~u. We also include benchmarking code used to compare
the performance of SLICENDICE against the aforementioned
baselines. Unfortunately, given that the Snapchat advertiser
data contains sensitive PII (personally identifiable informa-
tion), it is not possible for us to release the dataset publicly. In
fact, to the best of our knowledge, no such real-world social
datasets are publicly available in the multi-attribute setting.
This is because although the multi-attribute detection setting
is a highly common one in many social platforms, attributed
data in these settings is typically PII.
